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Temperature variability implies greater economic
damages from climate change
Raphael Calel 1✉, Sandra C. Chapman 2, David A. Stainforth 2,3,4 & Nicholas W. Watkins2,4,5
A number of influential assessments of the economic cost of climate change rely on just a
small number of coupled climate–economy models. A central feature of these assessments is
their accounting of the economic cost of epistemic uncertainty—that part of our uncertainty
stemming from our inability to precisely estimate key model parameters, such as the Equi-
librium Climate Sensitivity. However, these models fail to account for the cost of aleatory
uncertainty—the irreducible uncertainty that remains even when the true parameter values
are known. We show how to account for this second source of uncertainty in a physically
well-founded and tractable way, and we demonstrate that even modest variability implies
trillions of dollars of previously unaccounted for economic damages.
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H istorical time series of global mean temperatures (GMT)exhibit substantial variability on annual, decadal, andlonger timescales1–3 (Fig. 1). Global climate models also
exhibit substantial internal variability, although less than in the
historical record on longer timescales1. This variability means that
even if we were able to accurately predict the expectation of GMT
in each year (the ensemble mean over a collection of trajectories
with different realisations of internal variability), our forecast
trajectory would almost certainly miss the mark in any given year.
Although parts of the scientific4 and economic5 communities
have long recognised that the climate may be better represented
as a stochastic system, official assessments of climate damages still
rely on models with deterministic GMT6–8. Their deterministic
models generate trajectories of the expectation of GMT. These
assessments can therefore account for uncertainty in the expected
response to changing greenhouse gas concentrations by varying
model parameters, but by design they omit that part of our
uncertainty that arises from the deviations of individual realistic
trajectories from the trajectory of the expectation.
To understand the economic consequences of this omission,
start by noting that the annual GMT anomaly, ΔT, is the main
input into the calculation of the economic damages from climate
change. The annual economic damages from climate change,
measured as a share of global annual output, are typically cal-
culated by passing ΔT through a non-linear damage function
(Fig. 1). The annual damages are then discounted and summed
across all future years to give an estimate of total economic
damages from climate change (Supplementary Note 5).
Notice that, if ΔT in any given year is represented by a dis-
tribution then this calculation produces a distribution of climate
damages instead of a single-valued forecast (Fig. 1). Furthermore,
the greater the positive autocorrelation of ΔT, the wider the
distribution of the discounted and summed estimates of total
economic damages (Supplementary Note 8).
To capture this type of uncertainty, we have to extend the
standard deterministic model. The simplest physical model that
describes the stochastic behaviour of GMTs over time, and how
this stochasticity depends on the underlying physical parameters,
can be written as follows4:
CdΔT ¼ Fdt  λΔTdt þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2Qdt
q
ϵ; ð1Þ
where C is the effective heat capacity, F the forcing, λ the feedback
parameter, and σ2Q is the variance of a zero-mean Gaussian noise
process, ϵ. Figure 2 shows the different characteristics of the
temperature time series produced when C, λ, and σ2Q are cali-
brated to historical data (Supplementary Note 6), and also when
σ2Q is set to zero, as in the deterministic model. Note that the
autocorrelation characteristics of this model can produce trajec-
tories where many decades are above or below the deterministic
trajectory (Fig. 2a).
We show, next, that adding realistic variability in global tem-
perature in this way creates substantial uncertainty in future
damages, equivalent to trillions of dollars of previously unac-
counted for economic costs of climate change. The interaction of
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty can further magnify these
costs. Most of these costs cannot be avoided solely by strength-
ening mitigation policies at the margin. Our findings instead
point to the conclusion that the benefits of adaptation are much
greater than previously believed.
Results
Uncertainty about damages. Adding realistic temperature
variability gives rise to substantial uncertainty in total climate
damages (Fig. 2b). The deterministic model forecasts $486 trillion
in total damages for the forcing scenario RCP8.5, but the sto-
chastic model assigns a 5% chance to damages exceeding $563
trillion, 16% higher than the deterministic forecast. The 5–95%
range for the stochastic model is (−13%, +16%) of the deter-
ministic forecast. Lower forcings produce less warming, naturally,
so the same amount of temperature variability produces greater
relative dispersion of damages. For RCP2.6, for instance, the
5–95% range for the stochastic model is (−30%, +52%) of the
deterministic forecast of $30 trillion.
The risk premium. One conventional measure of the cost of this
uncertainty is the so-called ‘risk premium’, also reported in Fig. 2.
It is an answer to the question of what the canonical social
planner would be willing to pay today to follow the deterministic
temperature trajectory rather than to face an uncertain future.
Another way to think about it is the value of insurance against
aleatory uncertainty about future temperatures, if such an
insurance product could be bought. The risk premium is
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Fig. 1 Temperature variability results in uncertain climate damages. a Observed and global circulation model simulated temperature trajectories are
plotted here to illustrate the inter-annual variability typically present. From bottom up, the plot includes HadCRUT (observation), run 9 of EC-EARTH-4, run
1 of ACCESS1-0, and run 1 of CMCC-CMS (the last three being members of the CMIP5 ensemble). The four time series are offset to make the nature of the
variability easier to see. b Reflects an illustrative normal distribution of the global mean temperature anomaly (μ= 8 and σ= 0.4) through Weitzman’s
damage function15 to obtain economic damages as a share of global economic output. The shading traces the ±σ range, ±2σ, and ±3σ of the temperature
distribution, and shows that the damage distribution becomes left tailed when the expected value of global mean temperature is sufficiently high. It
becomes right tailed when the expected value is lower.
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calculated by evaluating the difference between the expected
utility of the deterministic trajectory and that of the ensemble of
stochastic trajectories (Supplementary Note 5). If the social
planner knew to expect RCP2.6 forcings, for instance, she would
today be willing to pay up to $3 trillion to eliminate just the
internal variability, which is roughly 4% of current global output.
A social planner that knew to expect RCP8.5 forcings would pay
as much as $32 trillion, 40% of current output. Relative to the
projections of the deterministic model, these risk premia repre-
sent anywhere from 6 to 13% in additional damages.
Interacting risks. So far, we have only considered the cost of
aleatory uncertainty while assuming fixed values of the model
parameters. In practice, there is of course uncertainty about the
deterministic trajectory as well, typically represented as uncer-
tainty about the true values of the model parameters (epistemic
uncertainty). One key parameter about which there is a great deal
of uncertainty is the equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), which
is inversely related to the feedback parameter λ at double CO2.
Integrated assessment modellers typically capture this by rerun-
ning the deterministic model for a sample of ECS values and
producing a distribution of climate damages7. We can do the
same thing with the stochastic model, which tells us how the cost
of aleatory uncertainty changes when there is also epistemic
uncertainty.
The risk premia reported in Fig. 3 show what the canonical
social planner, faced with both epistemic and aleatory uncer-
tainty, would be willing to pay to remove just the aleatory
uncertainty. When faced with RCP2.6 forcings, a social planner
that has epistemic uncertainty about the ECS, and aleatory
uncertainty about the particular trajectory that would be realised
for any given ECS, would be willing to pay $9 trillion to remove
just the temperature variability, or roughly 11% of current global
output. Faced with RCP8.5 forcings, she would be willing to pay
as much as $46 trillion, over half of current output.
These risk premia are substantially higher than before as a
result of how these two sources of uncertainty interact. In the
stochastic model both the mean and the variance of the
temperature are decreasing functions of λ, and thus increasing
functions of the ECS deduced from λ. A high draw from the ECS
distribution therefore produces both greater mean warming and
greater variability (Supplementary Note 2). The effect of a higher
ECS on the variance of temperature would be weaker if a
fluctuation–dissipation theorem applied9–11, but it would not
alter the fact that high draws become disproportionately more
costly. This implies that the addition of stochasticity will produce
damage distributions with an even fatter right tail than in the
deterministic case. This is a distinct effect arising from the
interaction of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties.
Epistemic uncertainty about the climate’s response, then, can
magnify the cost of inter-annual and multi-decadal variability
(Fig. 3). Since we cannot remove aleatory uncertainty, this risk
premium is best thought of as a previously unaccounted for cost
of climate change.
The social cost of carbon. It is worth making special note of the
distinction between the risk premia that we have estimated here
and the marginal damage caused by releasing an additional tonne
of CO2, the so-called social cost of carbon (SCC). The risk pre-
mium measures the additional cost of living with aleatory
uncertainty as compared to living in a deterministic world. The
SCC, by contrast, measures the cost of releasing just one more
tonne of CO2 within a stochastic or deterministic framework.
Even though the risk premium is substantial, we may well face the
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Fig. 2 Damages with deterministic and stochastic temperatures. a Temperature trajectories produced by the deterministic model (in black) and from a
single run of the stochastic model (in colour) with forcings taken from RCP8.5, 6.0, 4.5, and 2.6 (from top to bottom). We assume C= 109 Jm−2K−1, λ=
1.23Wm−2K−1, and σQ= 0.9375 × 108 Wm−2s½, to approximate historical variability. b The distributions of damages obtained from ensembles of 10,000
temperature trajectories and a discount rate of 4.25% (to match16). The deterministic damages as well as the 5–95% range for the damage distribution are
noted along the axis. The risk premia are included along the right edge, telling us what the canonical social planner (also with a 4.25% discount rate) would
in principle be willing to pay to avoid inter-annual temperature variability, measured both in current dollars and as a share of current global output. See
Supplementary Note 5 for a description of these calculations, Supplementary Note 6 for a discussion of the parameter choices, and Supplementary Note 7
for sensitivity analysis.
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same temperature variability whether or not we release an addi-
tional tonne of CO2. Aleatory uncertainty is therefore unlikely to
have much effect on the SCC (Supplementary Note 9). The
crucial point to note is that the SCC and the risk premium
provide answers to two different questions. The SCC tells us
about costs that society can avoid through abatement of the
marginal tonne of CO2. The risk premium primarily tells us about
costs that we need to prepare for because they cannot be avoided
in this way. The way to avoid them, rather, is through adaptation.
The cost of adaptation is beyond the scope of the present
investigation, but our findings suggest that the benefits are much
greater than previously believed.
Discussion
Adding temperature variability to a simple integrated assessment
model results in greater economic damages from climate change.
What is new here is neither the physics nor the economics—both
of which closely follow canonical models in their respective fields
—but we find that the careful combination of insights from these
two disciplines reveals trillions of dollars of previously uncounted
damages.
These damage estimates are substantial, but it is worth noting
that they are likely to be on the conservative side. One reason for
this is the typically high discount rate that is assumed for this type
of analysis, which we have followed here (4.25%). If we relax this
assumption, the damages from aleatory uncertainty become many
times larger (Supplementary Note 7).
Another reason our estimates are conservative is the handling
of temperature autocorrelation. The climate system represented
by Eq. (1) is a continuous autoregressive process of the first order
(Supplementary Note 2). It consequently exhibits autocorrelation,
but it does not exhibit true long-range dependence, what has been
termed the ‘Joseph effect’12 after the biblical story in which 7
years of plenty are followed by 7 years of famine. The auto-
correlation in our model increases the probability of persistent
events of this nature compared to a simple white noise time series,
but if the climate system exhibits true long-range dependence13,
long runs of extreme temperatures are even more likely than this
simple model predicts. In this case, temperatures would be more
likely to persistently deviate from the deterministic trajectory
trend in one direction or the other, and the net present value of
damages (plotted in Fig. 2) would be even more variable.
It should be noted, though, that this temperature persistence
does not directly translate into higher risk premia for aleatory
uncertainty in our analysis. The damage function and the social
welfare function have no memory. It therefore only matters how
the shape of the temperature distribution evolves over time, but it
does not matter what the individual temperature trajectories look
like that make up that evolving distribution. Autocorrelation gives
rise to more extreme individual temperature trajectories, which
widens the distribution of economic damages integrated over
time, but this does not affect the risk premium (Supplementary
Note 8). For the social planner envisioned by these integrated
assessment models, then, the degree of autocorrelation of tem-
peratures is largely irrelevant.
The simple integrated assessment models were built with a
deterministic climate in mind, of course, so it is not entirely
surprising that they are poorly equipped to deal with the con-
sequences of temperature autocorrelation. But if societies lack the
foresight to plan for longer periods of extreme climatic condi-
tions, seven consecutive years of drought may be much more
difficult to endure than if they were interspersed with years of
plenty. In the story of Joseph, let us not forget, civilisation is saved
only thanks to a divine prophecy. If, in reality, more strongly
autocorrelated temperatures produce greater damages, then the
true cost of temperature variability is likely to be substantially
larger than we estimate here. More concretely, a country like Syria
may be reasonably successful at containing the damage of a 1-
year or even 2-year drought, but collapse under the weight of a 3-
year drought, having far-reaching and disproportionate con-
sequences. The combination of anthropogenic forcing and auto-
correlated natural variability makes such severe droughts much
more likely14. An important challenge in the years to come will be
to pin down how damages accumulate during longer periods of
extreme climate, so that these effects can be incorporated into
future assessments of the economic damages from climate
change.
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Fig. 3 Aleatory uncertainty risk premia with and without underlying epistemic uncertainty. This plot shows what the canonical social planner would be
willing to pay to avoid aleatory uncertainty when there is also underlying epistemic uncertainty. To compute these risk premia, we first obtain an ensemble
of temperature trajectories by solving the deterministic EBM for a distribution of values of the equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS). We assume that the
ECS is log-normally distributed with a most likely value of 3 °C and Pr(2≤ ECS≤ 4.5)= 0.66, in line with the IPCC’s fourth and fifth assessments, and
otherwise uses the same physical assumptions as in Fig. 2. Next, we obtain a second ensemble by solving the stochastic energy balance model for the same
distribution of ECS values. Both ensembles reflect the same epistemic uncertainty, but only the second incorporates aleatory uncertainty as well. The risk
premia shown here are the difference between the expected utility of damages for the two ensembles (Supplementary Note 5). These risk premia can be
decomposed into two parts: the darker portion of each bar shows the risk premium when all uncertainty is aleatory (same as in Fig. 2), while the lighter
portion shows the additional risk premium arising from an interaction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. This risk interaction effect arises
because a high draw from the ECS distribution produces both greater mean warming and greater variability, which makes the high draws disproportionately
more costly. This results in damage distributions with a fatter right tail.
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